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ADVANCES IN THE BEHAVIORAL
ANALYSIS OF LAW: MARKETS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND CONTRACTS
AVISHALOM TOR*
The collection of articles in this Special Issue is based on an international
conference on Advances in the Behavioral Analysis of Law: Markets,
Institutions, and Contracts that took place on December 8, 2009 at the
University of Haifa Faculty of Law in Israel. The conference addressed cuttingedge legal issues at the intersection of law, economics, and psychology from a
diverse set of viewpoints, bringing together scholars engaged in both theoretical
and experimental behavioral analyses of law.
The behavioral analysis of law—the application of empirical behavioral
evidence to legal analysis—has become increasingly popular in legal scholarship
in recent years.1 This approach provides an explicit account of legally relevant
behavior based on empirical research instead of intuition or theory alone.
Drawing on the extensive findings of behavioral decision research, the
psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (JDM), and related fields, the
behavioral approach thus offers an empirically-based middle ground between
the theoretical abstractions of the rational-actor model used by traditional law
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1. For instance, a search in the “Law Reviews and Journals, Combined” database in LexisNexis,
as of March 17, 2011, for the terms “behavioral law and economics” or “behavioral analysis” yielded
944 results, 463 of them from the last 5 years. See also Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too
Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1907, 1909–10 & nn.5–6 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress
Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115, 115 (1999) (describing a “flood” of behaviorally-oriented legal
research already in 1999). For some additional reviews and broad applications of behavioral findings to
the law, see, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1051 (2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998) (showing the broad range of
behavioral application in the legal literature at the time, even before this approach had become widely
popular).

TOR

ii

3/10/2011

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 74:i

and economics and the implicit, intuitive, and unstructured view of human
behavior of traditional legal scholarship.2
More specifically, behavioral decision research emphasizes that humans are
“boundedly rational”—they possess limited cognitive resources and are affected
by motivation and emotion.3 Sometimes, they engage in formal, effortful, and
time-consuming judgment and decision-making.4 More commonly, however, to
survive and function in a complex world, individuals use highly adaptive and
often useful mental and emotional heuristics when making judgments under
uncertainty; they also rely extensively on situational cues to guide their choices.5
However, heuristic judgment and cue-dependent choice also lead to systematic
and predictable deviations from strictly rational behavior.6
Yet despite its many recent contributions, current behavioral-legal
scholarship exhibits certain limitations, a number of which are addressed by
articles in this issue. For one, only a limited number of legal scholars examined
the interaction between behavioral deviations from rational action and the
operation of markets, firms, and similar institutions.7 This shortage stems, at
least in part, from a common belief in the power of competitive markets and
those business associations that operate within them to overcome deviations

2. For a detailed exposition, see generally Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. REV. 237 (2008).
3. The concept of bounded rationality was originally developed by Herbert A. Simon. See
generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955); Herbert
A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129 (1956). In
Simon’s terminology, however, bounded rationality denoted only the cognitive limitations of the
human mind, while the present usage is broader, referring to the various inherent limitations of human
judgment and decision-making. See Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market
Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 485 & n.4 (2002) (explaining this broader usage of
the term). See also Douglas MacLean, Some Morals of a Theory of Nonrational Choice, in JUDGMENTS,
DECISIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 46, 48 (Rajeev Gowda & Jeffrey C. Fox eds., 2002) (noting that
psychological evidence on nonrational judgment and decision behavior present a qualitatively deeper
challenge to the rationality assumption than the one posed by Simon’s early bounded rationality view).
4. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 50
(Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
5. See, e.g., BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard
Selten eds., 2001); JOHN W. PAYNE, JAMES R. BETTMAN & ERIC J. JOHNSON, THE ADAPTIVE
DECISION MAKER 2 (1993) (developing the thesis that the use of heuristics and varying decision
strategies “is an adaptive response of a limited-capacity information processor to the demands of
complex decision tasks”).
6. See Tor, supra note 2, at 245–72 (2008) (reviewing findings on judgment and choice,
respectively).
7. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the
Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
135 (2002); Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding
Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002); Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke,
Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2011); Tor, supra note 3; Avishalom Tor, Illustrating a
Behaviorally-Informed Approach to Antitrust Law: The Case of Predatory Pricing, 18 ANTITRUST 52
(2003).
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from rational action.8 However, while these institutions may sometimes
ameliorate or even eliminate behavioral phenomena,9 at other times, they
exacerbate them, introduce additional deviations from rational action, or simply
fail to discipline these deviations from rational action, generating effects that
behavioral analyses of the law should account for.10 Notably, behavioral
contributions are now common in disciplines such as management and
economics that grapple with closely related questions.11
In addition, most behavioral-legal analyses have been based on theoretical
applications of extant empirical evidence.12 Yet while this scholarship already
has made significant contributions to the law, there is a pressing need for
additional, focused, empirical research of behavioral-legal questions. In
particular, legal scholarship often stands to benefit from experimental tests that
can directly examine legally-relevant behavior while controlling for potential
confounds and selection effects.13 Such experiments, moreover, can also shed
light on the psychological mechanisms underlying the behavioral effects, which
may be difficult to discern based on field evidence even when they have
important policy implications.14
The present issue addresses these challenges by bringing together a unique
set of wide-ranging contributions from scholars with behavioral expertise and
diverse disciplinary backgrounds in law, psychology, and economics. These
contributions direct their nuanced inquiries to the interplay of behavioral
phenomena, markets, and other legal institutions; a number of them also
employ focused experimental tests to generate new, relevant data. Moreover,
the articles in this issue address three important areas of behavioral-legal
analysis, including litigation and procedure, contracts and market behavior, and
the design of the law and legal institutions more generally.

8. See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1, at 1473 (“[L]aw is a domain where behavioral
analysis would appear to be particularly promising in light of the fact that nonmarket behavior is
frequently involved.”).
9. See Tor, supra note 3, at 562; Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New
Approach to the Rule of Reason after Leegin, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at
55), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522948.
10. See Tor, supra note 3, at 561–67; Tor & Rinner, supra note 9 (manuscript at 55–56).
11. For some significant research in these areas, see generally JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING (Robert H. Ashton & Alison Hubbard Ashton eds.,
1995); MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (6th ed. 2005);
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein & Matthew Rabin
eds., 2004); ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING (Zur Shapira ed., 1997); ADVANCES IN
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993); 2 ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
(Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005).
12. See Tor, supra note 2, at 274–81; sources cited supra note 1.
13. See Tor, supra note 2, at 281–91; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Loses, and the Psychology of
Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996) (combining the analysis of field data with controlled
experiments). See, e.g., Avishalom Tor, Oren Gazal-Ayal & Stephen M. Garcia, Fairness and the
Willingness To Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97 (2010) (using simple
experimental tests to complement suggestive field data).
14. See Tor, supra note 2, at 281–91.
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In the first area, Eyal Zamir and Ilana Ritov’s article on Notions of Fairness
and Contingent Fees uses experimental tests to show how perceptions of fairness
impose a constraint on attorneys’ contingent fee arrangements and thus impact
the market for legal services.15 These tests show that high contingent fee rates
are considered unfair even when they result in low effective hourly rates, while
the opposite holds for low contingent fee rates. Moreover, the effect of the
contingent fee rate on the perceived fairness of the arrangement is significantly
greater than that of other factors that are equally relevant, including the
claimed sum, the probability of recovery, and the hours the attorney works on
the case.16 Somewhat surprisingly, however, the studies also found that the
perceived fairness of contingent fee arrangements was not directly correlated to
their preferences when choosing between contingent and non-contingent fee
arrangements. This finding, in turn, suggests that factors other than clients’
preferences—such as attorneys’ reputational concerns or legal caps—drive high
contingent fee arrangements out of the market even where client and attorney
would both have found them attractive.17 Hence, the absence of such
arrangements may reflect a fairness constraint on market transactions rather
than those commonly asserted forms of market failure such as imperfect
competition or asymmetric information.18
Ronen Perry and Dana Weimann Saks follow with their article Stealing
Sunshine, providing experimental evidence for the efficacy of a trial advocacy
technique—the mirror-view of the familiar “stealing thunder” strategy—
whereby an attorney discloses early in the trial information that appears
advantageous to the other party to mitigate its impact on fact-finders.19 In a first,
exploratory study of this technique, the authors find evidence suggesting that
stealing sunshine can mitigate the impact on fact-finders’ decisions of positive
information about an opponent—that is harmful to the position of one’s
client—in litigation.20
Turning to the second area of behavioral applications, Claire Hill asks in the
third article Why Didn’t Subprime Investors Demand a (Much Larger) Lemons
Premium? In her article, she argues that this phenomenon, which had a
significant role in generating the recent global financial crisis, resulted from
investors’ biased incentive structure. Hill points to “herding” among investment
managers—who are evaluated vis à vis their peers—and the regret avoidance of
individual investors as the most significant factors generating this bias.21
15. Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Notions of Fairness and Contingent Fees, 74 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (Spring 2011).
16. Id. at 18–19.
17. Id. at 21, 25–29.
18. Id. at 30.
19. Ronen Perry & Dana Weimann-Saks, Stealing Sunshine, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33
(Spring 2011).
20. Id. at 44–45.
21. Claire A. Hill, Why Didn’t Subprime Investors Demand a (Much Larger) Lemons Premium?,
74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 50 (Spring 2011).
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Following this analysis, Hill concludes that increased accountability—through
norms or regulation—is needed to remedy this bias.22
The fourth article, by Shmuel Becher and Tal Zarsky, addresses Open
Doors, Trap Doors, and the Law. These authors show how legal arrangements
that leave doors open—that is, provide a time-limited opportunity to rescind or
withdraw from contractual obligations, such as mandatory cooling-off periods
or product return policies—generate significant and largely unrecognized social
costs that policymakers should take into account.23 Specifically, these authors
argue that open door policies may encourage consumers to overpay for open
doors, enter transactions that they otherwise might not have entered, and
more.24 Becher and Zarsky thus suggest that scholars and policymakers direct
more careful attention to the hidden costs of open-door policies, which
although sometimes beneficial, may require regulatory intervention in certain
settings.25
The fifth article in the volume and the final one in this area, Harmful
Freedom of Choice: Lessons from the Cellphone Market by Adi Ayal, argues
that the proliferation of service plans and options in the cellular markets harms
consumers instead of benefiting them, due to the behavioral effects of excessive
choice.26 Drawing on empirical findings from psychology and economics alike,
Ayal asserts that the combined effects of contractual complexity on the one
hand, and cellular market characteristics—most notably concentration—on the
other hand, generate not only direct consumer harm, but may also diminish
competition in the market.27 Following this analysis, Ayal examines the
desirability of alternative approaches to regulatory intervention in the cellular
market aimed to address both the consumer protection and antitrust harms of
excess choice, concluding that the ultimate verdict on such interventions is
unclear and should await further analysis.28
In the last area of application, in Yuval Feldman and Shahar Lifshitz’s
Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty, the authors argue that legal uncertainty,
which is typically viewed as an undesirable, if unavoidable, feature of the law, is
in fact sometimes advantageous in a broad array of legal settings.29 Combining
jurisprudential argument with behavioral analysis and experimental
demonstrations, the authors show that the law can distort individual choice and
that under some circumstances, uncertainty can help individuals act in a non-

22. Id. at 61–62.
23. Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, Open Doors, Trap Doors, and the Law, 74 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (Spring 2011).
24. Id. at 82–88.
25. Id. at 88–90.
26. Adi Ayal, Harmful Freedom of Choice: Lessons from the Cellphone Market, 74 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (Spring 2011).
27. Id. at 93–112.
28. Id. at 126–30.
29. Yuval Feldman and Shahar Lifshitz, Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty, 74 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (Spring 2011).
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strategic manner, better expressing their genuine preferences, moral
perceptions, and true economic interests.30 However, Feldman and Lifshitz also
recognize that a “veil of uncertainty” may not only facilitate genuine choice, but
may also undermine the law’s ability to guide social behavior through
deterrence and incentives as well as its expressive function.31 The authors thus
conclude that while the adoption of uncertainty-promoting law is desirable in
certain settings, this approach should be limited to areas where the main
function of the law is neither the guidance of ex-ante behavior nor the
expression of social values.32
And finally, in the seventh article, Amir Licht discusses Law for the
Common Man: An Individual-Level Theory of Values, Expanded Rationality,
and the Law.33 Drawing on psychological theories of personal values, Licht seeks
to outline an analytical framework that draws on the psychological value-based
theory to expand and provide content to the familiar economic concept of
individual utility.34 In this approach, personal values, in the sense of the
desirable, guide people’s judgments and choices in more concrete and specific
ways than the abstract goal of utility maximization.35 After outlining the main
characteristics of this value-based theory of expanded rationality, Licht
proceeds to show how this theory promotes positive legal analysis, most notably
because a better understanding of individuals’ view of the desirable helps clarify
how and why the law is designed to guide behavior towards socially desirable
goals.36
Altogether, therefore, the seven articles in this issue reflect new and
ongoing developments in the application of behavioral insights and
methodology to legal scholarship in key areas of doctrine and policy-making
alike. Interestingly, one finds that even while the various articles provide both
new empirical data and cutting-edge analyses, they raise at least as many new
questions for future legal scholarship as they answer, highlighting the challenges
facing an effective behavioral analysis of law and the many contributions it
stands to make.

30. Id. at 142–55.
31. Id. at 164–72.
32. Id. at 169–72.
33. Amir N. Licht, Law for the Common Man: An Individual-Level Theory of Values, Expanded
Rationality, and the Law, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175 (Spring 2011).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 176–92.
36. Id. at 203–06.

